As predicted, the nationalist parties have slightly improved their scores in the European parliamentary elections. Put together, the parties belonging to the European Conservatives & Reformists and Identity & Democracy groups have won 131 seats over the 720 of the European Parliaments, to which we should also add part of the 100 seats earned by non-aligned parties. This is a half-empty-or-half-full-glass situation. On the one hand, you can note that far-right nationalists gained only 6 seats compared to their 2019 result – though again there also are nationalists in the non-affiliated. The political balance has not been significantly altered, with the center-right European People’s Party (186 seats, 182 in 2019) and the center-left Socialists and Democrats (135 seats, 154 in 2019) remaining the two top political forces. It’s true that the liberals of Renew (from 108 seats in 2019 to 79) and the Greens (from 74 to 53) have significantly receded, but we have not witnessed the populist wave that some predicted – not the polls though. (Source)
On the other hand, you can focus on the results of the EU’s two biggest countries, both economically and demographically, France and Germany. The perspective is then gloomier. In Germany, the nationalists of the AfD arrived in second position, though far behind the conservatives. Much of course has already been written about France, where the catastrophic results of the liberal party Renaissance pushed Macron to call snap elections. The first polls indicate that the far-right nationalists (Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and Zemmour’s Reconquête) will do well, though they are predicted to fall short of the absolute majority.[1] In France’s case at least, the European elections may mark the beginning of a new political era with a never-seen “cohabitation” between a (broadly speaking) liberal President and a far-right nationalist government.
There would be much to say about Macron’s strategic call but I’m not an expert in political commentary, so I leave that to others. Instead, I shall take political current affairs as an excuse to pursue my reflection on nationalism that I’ve started in my previous essay. In the latter, I noted that Isaiah Berlin’s characterization of nationalism and his account of the roots of nationalist sentiments don’t seem to fit the European nationalism that is currently at play completely. According to Berlin, nationalism is a backlash produced by a feeling of collective humiliation. The effect is an overreaction emphasizing the virtues and exceptionality of the national character, more often than not putting the national people in stark conflict with what is perceived as unfriendly if not barely hostile competing cultures. This is a plausible account of the rise of German nationalism during the interwar and contemporary Russian nationalism. But, as an account of the sort of nationalism behind the vote for the ID and ECR groups, it is far less compelling.
In addition to what I said in the previous essay, I would present the difference in terms of “offensive” versus “defensive” forms of nationalism. The kind of nationalism Berlin is talking about corresponds to circumstances where a group of persons who share a sense of national identity resent the way they have been treated as a nation constituted by a common culture, a common language, a shared history, and other collectively shared representations. Casual observation but also empirical studies on the nationalist-populist vote in Western countries suggest a different picture.[2] While part of the nationalist-populist vote is undoubtedly tied to a sense of national identity that ascribes a special value to the preservation of what is perceived as constitutive of one’s national culture, it can also be accounted by the fact that the nation is perceived as an ultimate protection against a series of outside threats, ranging from the loss of jobs due to immigration, international competition, or automation, to the transformation of ways of life and social mores. In other words, the nationalist-populist is not only about protecting and reaffirming the value of one’s nation, it is also that the nation is viewed as providing a stable shared frame within which the individuals (with the help of the state) can lessen the adverse effects of unwanted economics, social, and cultural changes. This is a defensive nationalism in the sense that the goal is not to extend the domination of one’s national culture and values but rather to preserve it as a shelter.
Where Berlin still seems to be right is in the idea that rationalist thinkers (be they liberals or Marxists) have erred in viewing nationalism as a pathology whose fate is to disappear as economic, social, cultural, and moral progress proceeds. This has – painfully – proved to be false in the 20th century and, as far as we can tell, also in the 21st century. Now, that doesn’t imply that the impossibility of getting rid of nationalism entails that we should accept living in a world where nationalist-populist parties attract 20% or more of the electorate, if they are not coming to power.
In his enlightening short text “La démocratie sans la nation ?” (“Democracy Without Nation?”), the French philosopher Pierre Manent argues that modern democracy is intimately tied to the concept of nation, such the very existence of democracy cannot be disentangled from its in a national body.[3] In a way, Manent’s article strengthens Berlin’s claim that nationalism is not a bug but a feature of democratic and liberal regimes. But Manent clarifies what makes the nation so important for the proper functioning of democracy, while Berlin’s writings remain ambiguous about the normative desirability of a modicum of nationalism in the democratic form of life.
Manent’s thesis is that the nation provides the “body” within which the abstract democratic notions of the general will and people’s sovereignty can be incarnated and take a concrete form. Without such a body, modern democracy remains an abstract principle of political legitimacy and consent that, theoretically, can be applied to all forms of human action in general. That is, democratic principles can take form in all kinds of human communities, from the family to a union of nations. So the fundamental problem: “The democratic principle does not determine the framework within which it applies.”[4] The problem is obviously acute in the context of the European Union whose construction, Manent suggests, has proceeded on the assumption that democracy could be disentangled from its national ties.
What kind of nationalism can answer to the fundamental problem? Manent singles out two radically different stances. Presciently,[5] he notes that nationalism can manifest as part of the expression of one’s identity. The notion of national identity, or cultural identity, is then fundamental and plays the same role as the one identified by Isaiah Berlin. The nation’s culture becomes part of what the individual takes to be constitutive of themselves and must therefore be defended at all costs. The alternative is to view the nation as the bedrock of the political community within which collective deliberation about justice and the good is possible. The nation provides the framework for political action because it is coextensive to the political community where collective choices can be made. Distinguishing between these two stances is important for at least two reasons. First, the nation-as-political-community stance doesn’t lead to the same kind of defensive attitude as the national-as-cultural-identity stance. In the context of the construction of the European Union, the former makes it less of an object of conflict where the highest stakes are the defense of national identities but rather a collective project to find new and complementary ways of political action. Second, as a component of the so-called identity politics, the national-as-cultural-identity stance enters into conflict with other kinds of identities that are thought to be politically relevant. In a way, this is part of the explanation for political polarization that builds over conflicting views about which identities are politically relevant. If the importance given to the nation follows from an expression of one’s identity, then it’s not surprising that nationalism is seen as an archaism given that there are so many new sources on which one can ground their personal and social identities.
Because this is the framework I find the most compelling to reflect on most moral and political issues, let me try to reformulate Manent’s thesis using the concepts of public reason liberalism. The nation-as-cultural-identity stance would argue that considerations of national and cultural identity must be among the reasons that can be rightfully invoked in the process of public justification. Rawlsians would reject this, as nationalism is the expression of a “comprehensive doctrine” that cannot ground principles of justice. Convergence theorists à la Gerald Gaus or Kevin Vallier could grant the nationalist’s request, with the risk that reasons based on national identity enters in conflict with other identity-based reasons, creating a justificatory stalemate.[6] The nation-as-political-community stance rather points out that the nation is relevant to determine who are the “members of the public,” i.e., who are the individuals who have a say in the process of public justification. In principle, there is no restriction on the identification of the members of the public. Depending on the context, it can be the members of a family or a clan, or all the human beings on earth. Manent’s thesis is however that, partly maybe for anthropological and historical reasons, this is the nation that happens to be the most compelling framework to publicly justify laws and rules.
The challenge of the construction and extension of the European Union is to progressively elaborate a new political community that, without erasing the national political communities, can ground the exercise of public reason between individuals who view each other as members of the same public and treat each other not through the lens of rivalrous national identities, but as moral equals. This is for sure a tremendous challenge, but one that cannot be escaped once we have the appropriate understanding of the nationalist sentiment.
[1] Much will depend on the coalitions that emerge on the right and the left. These first polls should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.
[2] See for instance, with a focus on the French case, Yann Algan, Elizabeth Beasley, and Daniel Cohen, Les Origines du populisme: Enquête sur un schisme politique et social (Paris: Seuil, 2019).
[3] Pierre Manent, Enquête sur la démocratie: Études de philosophie politique (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), pp. 166-84. The article was originally published in Commentaires in 1996.
[4] Ibid., p. 172.
[5] Remember, the text was written in 1996.
[6] Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, Reprint edition (Cambridge New York,NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).; Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith (New York London: Routledge, 2016). Convergence theorists typically downplay the risk that opening public justification to a diversity of reasons ends in the impossibility of justifying any rules on some issues. I’ve written a friendly criticism of this view here.
The EU election, just by virtue of being an election for the EU as a whole, implies a rejection of nationalism in the traditional sense. In this election, perhaps for the first time, he political groupings, including the far-right, were seen as representing Europe-wide political positions. \
Brexit has generated this outcome in two ways. First by removing the only member of the EU which would commonly see itself as distinct from "Europe" and second by failing so miserably. That lesson will be reinforced when Britain eventually seeks re-entry, giving up all the special exemptions it used to have.
The result is that instead of advocating national exits from the EU, or even advocating specific national claims, all parties are now promoting political agendas which are much the same at national and EU level. On the other hand, there is no real sign of the far-right embracing a European national identity.
This is most obvious in relation to migration, which is the core issue for the far-right. AFAICT, there has been no challenge to freedom of movement within Europe, particularly not for EU citizens. Rather the far-right seeks tight restrictions on entry imposed at the Europe-wide level.
This is better understood as cultural xenophobia, focusing on white Christian identity, than as any kind of nationalism. For want of a better word, it's Trumpism.