Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is another path into this way of understanding symmetries and asymmetries in rights and obligations. Seems like a useful way to frame the problem of incompatible use of scarce resources.
Feels like you're chipping away at the right block of marble with what you're saying about polycentricity. I could make the argument that general incorporation statutes are the most tangible manifestation of workable polycentricity at present. I believe North, Wallis, and Weingast have spun this out into the most compelling theory of how such arrangements can be enablers to human flourishing.
Interesting! I think a practical way to solve this problem is customary. Customary norms encode common knowledge and give people heuristics about what is generally taken to externality ripe activists (that are not necessarily illegal). One can play one’s radio in the train, but we have a customary norm that guides us to avoid this activity due to externalities.
This is of course very crude and can be further developed. But I think customary norms present the conservative way to solve problems of rights, externalities and coordination
Merci, c’est assez lumineux sur la subjectivité des externalités et le « marchés des droits » qui en découle.
Ne pourrait-on pas imaginer une sorte d’enchère à la Vickrey qui inciterait les individus concernés à révéler leur coût (minimum) à payer pour ne pas empêcher un libre-échange ?
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is another path into this way of understanding symmetries and asymmetries in rights and obligations. Seems like a useful way to frame the problem of incompatible use of scarce resources.
Feels like you're chipping away at the right block of marble with what you're saying about polycentricity. I could make the argument that general incorporation statutes are the most tangible manifestation of workable polycentricity at present. I believe North, Wallis, and Weingast have spun this out into the most compelling theory of how such arrangements can be enablers to human flourishing.
Excellent essay.
Interesting! I think a practical way to solve this problem is customary. Customary norms encode common knowledge and give people heuristics about what is generally taken to externality ripe activists (that are not necessarily illegal). One can play one’s radio in the train, but we have a customary norm that guides us to avoid this activity due to externalities.
This is of course very crude and can be further developed. But I think customary norms present the conservative way to solve problems of rights, externalities and coordination
Merci, c’est assez lumineux sur la subjectivité des externalités et le « marchés des droits » qui en découle.
Ne pourrait-on pas imaginer une sorte d’enchère à la Vickrey qui inciterait les individus concernés à révéler leur coût (minimum) à payer pour ne pas empêcher un libre-échange ?