Is Longtermism Self-Defeating?
The topic of longtermism (LT) is currently fashionable, to say the least (for new readers, I have made a review of William McAskill’s book on the subject, but dozens of others are available on the web). So let’s continue to explore some of its implications. Here, I want to ask a simple question: is LT an indirectly self-defeating theory?
The notion of indirectly self-defeating theory is from Derek Parfit.[1] Consider some theory T that gives us aims to pursue, i.e., T-given aims. Parfit states that
T is indirectly individually self-defeating when it is true that, if someone tries to achieve his T-given aims, these aims will be, on the whole, worse achieved.
More relevant here is the possibility that a theory is indirectly collectively self-defeating:
T is indirectly collectively self-defeating when it is true that, if several people try to achieve their T-given aims, these aims will be worse achieved.
LT is basically a moral theory that recommends that we should act such as to maximize the expected value that is created by the existence of living (human and non-human) beings across time, starting from the present and through the future. This aim can be achieved based on two complementary sets of means: (i) by increasing the quality of present and future lives, for instance by improving the values that govern these lives; (ii) by increasing the number of future lives, notably by mitigating existential risks.
Stated like this, it might seem hard to see how LT could be indirectly collectively self-defeating. We may object to LT that it has its moral mathematics wrong, that it ignores deontological constraints, or that its implications about what we ought to do are completely implausible. But this is not the same as the objection that LT is self-defeating. We should contemplate however the political dimension of LT which is, as many commentators have noted, one of its main blind spots. LT is essentially silent about the political institutions required to achieve its aims. However, the “LT-given aims” are unlikely to be achievable without such institutions, if only because they involve many coordination and collective action problems. Moreover, there will be many disagreements on the best ways to achieve these aims through the two sets of means identified above. It is unclear what are the best ways to improve our values, and we may even disagree on what it means to “improve our values”. There will also be disagreements about how to increase the number of future lives, disagreements which we cannot expect to be fully resolved by a technocratic solution. So, we will need political mechanisms to aggregate judgments and preferences.
The problem is that it is unclear whether LT can stand the disagreement about the best way to pursue LT-given aims, without talking of the disagreement about the aims themselves that will unavoidably arise (see again the dozens of reviews of McAskill’s book). While the moral of LT is characterized by its cold-hearted calculations, its politics is less obvious. A salient feature of LT, as exemplified by McAskill’s book, is the small place given to the role of public policies and state institutions in achieving the targeted aims. It is clear that longtermists put more trust in private initiatives and market-based approaches, tainted with a significant dose of moral commitment. In itself, this is not an issue, and given the poor track record of state-based institutions in coping with climate change, maybe even be a sensible view. But on the other hand, it is not realistic to think that the goals of LT can be achieved without the state apparatus if only because at some point coercive measures are likely to be needed to prevent potentially destructive private initiatives.
What will happen then if longtermists cannot convince entrepreneurs, public officials, and citizens that we should all together pursue the aims of LT and make the counterintuitive tradeoffs that this implies? Longtermists may then find that the only way is to use coercion and so to use the state apparatus against the will of a large majority of the population. At least, if they are consistent with their ideology, longtermist must be disposed to take such measures to achieve their aims. But in doing so, they are likely to destroy the moral and political foundations that make future lives potentially so numerous and so valuable. Instead of improving moral values, such a disposition may quite the contrary destroy them.
Needless to say, none of the major figures of LT are recommending jettisoning liberal values and democratic principles. But this is precisely the point of self-defeating theory. They have practical implications that those endorsing them are not intending. Now, as Parfit argues, the fact that a moral theory is self-defeating does not necessarily constitute a refutation of it. Quite the contrary, it may help longtermists resist the most controversial aspects of their ideology. Because LT is indirectly collectively self-defeating, a longtermist is probably right to say,
“Even though my LT-aims require that I act based on a disposition such that I may have to disregard liberal values and democratic principles, such disposition would probably make my LT-aims less likely to be achieved, especially if others also act based on such a disposition. Therefore, I am permitted to act in a way that is contrary to this disposition.”
The fact that LT is self-defeating does not mean that it fails on its own terms because the realization that it is self-defeating leads to a better outcome. In other words, it encourages longtermists to be “morally immoral” by their own standard. This is therefore a very important insight that longtermists should keep in mind.
[1] Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (OUP, 1984), Chapter 1.