On the French (Supposed) Laziness

A Microeconomic Perspective

Very short summary: This essay examines the French supposed laziness through a microeconomic lens, separating preference- from incentive-based mechanisms that account for a lesser willingness to work. I consider pure laziness, Beckerian endogenous tastes, and identity norms; and weigh incentives from taxation, alleged superior leisure, and a potential low‑effort trap shaped by innovation dynamics and expectations. The argument downplays simple laziness, highlights taxes, norms, and learned leisure. Also, pessimistic expectations can become self-fulfilling, depressing effort and growth.

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Tyler Cowen recently asked the question: Are the French lazy? I want to expand on his reflections, with the benefit of having some insider knowledge on this issue. This is a fair question, in light of the well-acknowledged fact that the French (and Europeans in general) work less than Americans. For many, that is one of the main explanations for Europe’s relatively poor economic performance. On the other hand, a few economists like Gabriel Zucman argue that, far from being a problem, working less has been a “collective choice” made in France and Europe, reflecting Europeans’ different conception of the good life. In this spirit, in what follows, I will avoid talking about “laziness” as the word has an obvious negative connotation. I will rather talk about “low willingness to exert effort” (LWTE). I do not write this essay as a polemic; rather, I use basic microeconomic reasoning to clarify what might explain the French LWTE.

Let’s start with some facts. Consider first the average annual hours worked in some selected OECD countries (source: OECD):

There is a general trend of declining annual hours worked—an important point because that suggests that working less is not necessarily the sign of increased “laziness,” unless we just assume that everyone on Earth is becoming lazier. However, France is significantly below the OECD average, and far from the US. This is arguably a statistical manifestation of the French LWTE. This is combined with significant differences in employment rates, which range from 69% in France to 75% in the US, with an OECD average of 72% (source: OECD). Now, this is partially compensated by the fact that France has a relatively high GDP per hour worked (a measure of labor productivity), though lower than in the US (source: OECD):

So, stylized facts indeed suggest that the French exhibit LWTE and, though this is partially compensated by relatively high labor productivity, this can be viewed as a significant socioeconomic and political issue.

From a basic microeconomic perspective, there are two general ways to account for the fact that an individual, or a population, chooses to work less than another does: preferences or incentives. Consider the simplest case where an individual can allocate their time either to labor or to leisure. When that individual works, they earn income with which they consume. A preference-based explanation points out differences regarding how consumption from labor income and leisure are traded off against each other. An incentive-based explanation rather focuses on the returns from labor in terms of consumption units. So, LWTE can either result from a relatively strong preference for leisure or from relatively low returns from work:

However, that’s not enough because several factors can account for either a preference-based or an incentive-based LWTE. So let me unpack the various plausible explanations, starting with preference-based ones.

A. Preference-Based Explanation I: Pure “Laziness”

The simplest preference-based explanation is that the French would just have a higher “marginal rate of substitution” between labor and leisure. In other words, the French would be more willing to reduce their consumption from labor income to slightly increase their leisure time than Americans. Put in pejorative terms, the French would just be lazier than Americans. This is not very satisfactory, first because it’s only the beginning of an explanation (why French and American preferences differ in such a way?), and also because, as we have seen, people tend to work progressively less (in rich countries at least). So, an explanation in terms of pure laziness does not get us very far.

B. Preference-Based Explanation II: Beckerian Endogenous Preferences

In his post, Cowen links to a post on X that suggests a more sophisticated preference-based explanation: maybe French people “learned” to appreciate leisure as they got used to it. Gary Becker produced this kind of analysis to account for the endogenous formation of tastes, sometimes leading to “irrational” behavior such as addictions.[1] The basic idea behind this Beckerian-type explanation is that individuals’ choices create a “capital” that affects the returns of future choices. For instance, going to museums regularly creates a “personal cultural capital” that enhances the value of museum consumption in the future. Hence, preferences (and, therefore, marginal rates of substitution) change depending on people’s present decisions. In the case of the French LWTE, the fact that historically the French have worked less in the past would account for their current “lazy” preferences. They formed a “personal leisure capital” that increases the returns from leisure relative to consumption from work. This is partly compelling: after all, the French have a reputation of “knowing how to enjoy life,” and this is well captured by this Beckerian mechanism. There are two issues, however. First, in Becker’s theory, agents are assumed to be forward-looking and to rationally allocate present resources based on the effects of their current choices on their personal capital. It is unclear that the current French LWTE results from such forward-looking past choices. Second, we still have to explain why French people in the past were working less. Here, we surely need to combine the Beckerian account with an incentive-based explanation (see D below).

C. Preference-Based Explanation III: Identity and Norms

We can extend and twist the Beckerian account by introducing the role of social identity and social norms. People’s tradeoffs between leisure and labor may reflect a preference to conform to what is perceived as the norm or as the prescription related to one’s identity as “French.” Rachel Kranton and George Akerlof famously promoted this kind of identity-based explanation to account for a myriad of social phenomena, from gender discrimination to kids’ behavior at school.[2] In the present case, identity may work through different channels. First, at the national level, French law imposes a 35-hour-workweek standard. That doesn’t mean that people cannot work more than 35 hours per week,[3] only that they cannot be “forced” to do so. This legal standard also sets a social norm about what is expected of workers. Second, in organizations, this social norm can become an implicit prescription to which individuals prefer to conform, especially if everyone else does so. In some cases, people may even “proudly” limit their work hours as it reinforces their French identity as people who “know how to enjoy life.”

“The Floor Planers,” Gustave Caillebotte (1875)

Incentives also obviously matter. I see three mechanisms plausibly at play, one basic, the other more sophisticated:

D. Incentive-Based Explanation I: Income Taxes

The basic incentive-based explanation of LWTE is that the monetary, and hence private, consumption returns from work in France are relatively low. They are so because income taxes are relatively high. I emphasize “private” because in exchange for high income taxes, French people enjoy a high level of public goods that, in many cases, consist of (mostly) free services like education. However, as one’s consumption of public goods doesn’t depend on one’s income, it doesn’t incentivize work. On the other hand, private consumption is lower, other things equal, because private returns from work are lower. As long as income effects are not too important, this is enough to explain, partially at least, why French people choose to work less than in countries where income taxes are lower. This has nothing to do with “laziness.” It is a rational response to incentives.

E. Incentive-Based Explanation II: Higher Returns from Leisure

Cowen suggests that “parts of Europe have superior leisure opportunities” to (some parts of) the US. It’s very difficult to assess this explanation, and in any case, it depends where you’re living. All European and American big cities have great leisure opportunities, and I don’t think that the French or Europeans live more in big cities than Americans (I haven’t checked). So, I would tend to rule out this explanation.

F. Incentive-Based Explanation III: Low-Effort Trap

This is also suggested by Cowen, and I find this explanation more compelling. Returns from work can be lower in France for other reasons than taxation. For instance, lower productivity would entail lower returns, at least in the aggregate. Now, as I have pointed out above, French workers’ productivity is not so low, quite the contrary. However, if we live in a world of increasing returns, countries that are a step ahead in terms of innovation have a huge advantage that is likely to strengthen in the future. This is particularly obvious in AI: is it really worth it for Europe to make any effort to compete with the US and China, acknowledging that it will probably never catch them in terms of production and innovation capacities? Europe has missed the AI train, and it’s too late. This may apply to other domains as well. Add to this the fact that the US’s and China’s innovation and production efforts generate positive spillovers for Europe. After all, European consumers enjoy access to ChatGPT as much as American consumers. True, they cannot so easily afford the best and most expensive versions, but they can perfectly be happy settling for the inferior versions (marginal utility is decreasing for most users anyway). In other words, America’s economic performance is conducive to an (impure) public good. Finally, what matters most here are expectations. Even if French workers’ productivity is not low today, if they expect that the returns of their future efforts will decrease whatever they do now, this disincentivizes present effort. The Beckerian account is relevant here: if you believe that your present consumption choice will have no effect on your personal capital, and so you cannot do anything to counter its depreciation, then there is no incentive to “invest” in it. All these considerations concur to create a “low‑effort trap.”

The French LWTE is likely to be best explained by a combination of these different mechanisms. I would not give much weight to A and E as they don’t seem to have any serious empirical support. D, B, and C are definitely plausible and may explain a lot. F is also plausible and very concerning because it takes the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy that is very difficult to counter. This is part of the dangers of excessive pessimism that The Economist recently pointed out. Laziness is not the problem for France and Europe, but gloomy expectations definitely are a part of it.

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[1] Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Harvard University Press, 2009).

[2] George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Economics and Identity,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000): 715–53.

[3] Actually, they are incentivized to work more, as income from extra hours is not taxed (under some limits).