On the Relevance of the Concept of “Populism”
It is fairly common nowadays to hear talks of “populism”. While some have revendicated the term as a positive account of their views, it is mostly used to criticize political ideologies and practices that are gaining in popularity in Western liberal democracies. Not everyone likes the term, however. A recent example is economist Daniel Klein. Klein considers different possible meanings of the word populism, to ultimately discard them all. In substance, every possible definition corresponds to already existing terms or refers to features that are more aptly accounted for by a different term. He concludes that the use of the word populism is unwarranted because there are better words to refer to what it is thought to refer.
Klein is far from being alone in his skepticism about the use of populism in a political or economic context. And to be fair, he has a point. It is hard to dispute the fact that the term is often used in a sloppy way to condemn views with which one disagrees. Klein seems also to be worried by the fact that the term could be used (with a negative connotation) to refer to the kind of classical liberal views that he endorses. But even if we grant Klein’s claim that the word is often used in a sloppy way and that we sometimes have better words to refer to what we want, does it mean that we should ban the word “populism” from our vocabulary?
Formulated this way, the question trades on the confusion between agreeing on the definition of a word that is not synonymous with another one and agreeing on the conceptualization of a phenomenon that is thought to be relevant from a certain point of view. Let me explain. While it is undoubtedly important to be precise about the meaning of words, especially in a scientific or philosophical context, arguing about definitions is rarely productive. Definitions are important because definitional sloppiness creates confusion and ultimately impedes intellectual productivity. But whether or not the word X is the right word to refer to phenomenon Y is not what is really relevant. If you prefer to refer to Y with the word X’, well that’s your choice and ultimately a matter of convention. What matters is that in the end both you and I know that when you use X’ and I use X, we are both referring to Y. This is clearly not the most efficient situation, and that’s why we generally prefer to agree on the meaning of words. But in principle, this does not make mutual understanding impossible.
However, the problem with the word “populism” is not really a problem of definition. The issue is rather whether or not populism is a concept that is useful to capture a relevant phenomenon. What we are looking for is not so much a definition of a word than the characterization of a phenomenon through a concept. It is fairly common in social sciences and philosophy that we meet concepts that are hard to precisely define as words. Consider for instance the concept of “(social) justice”.[1] You can try to provide your definition of it. I will surely disagree with yours. You can look in a dictionary, but probably the definitions provided will not exactly correspond to what most philosophers have in mind. Few however would suggest that we should get rid of the concept of justice. The reason it is so is that behind the concept, one finds a range of conceptions that each capture specific views of what justice is about and why justice is important. The underlying conceptions may be so different that they apparently refer to similar but nonetheless different phenomena. In other words, the concept of justice refers to different things that have a family resemblance, to use a term popularized by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
I think the same can be said of the concept of populism. The meaning of the word is vague and difficult to precisely enunciate. But the concept may be useful to capture a range of similar phenomena that are more and more important from political and economic perspectives. There may be other words that define some of these phenomena, but none as concepts that are as powerful to capture all of them. This is precisely what is or should be at stake when disserting about the relevance of the concept of populism.
Now, as for justice, there is no doubt that there are different possible conceptions of populism. Each of them may emphasize different aspects of the range of features of the political and economic life that the concept is deemed to account for. A particularly important feature from my own perspective is related to the existence and nature of the general will and the way it is deemed to be personified by the political leader. More precisely, according to the conception of populism I would put forward, what is distinctive of populism as a (set of) ideology(s) and political movement is that (i) it pretends that it is possible to characterize what the general will is and that (ii) according to it the legitimacy of the political leader depends on its ability to express this general will through her person and her actions. From this very general characterization follows other features that many associate with the populist phenomenon: that political (and also economic or moral) disagreement is viewed as a problem that should be dealt with, that experts and elites are parasitic on the expression of the general will, a marked preference for nationalistic policies supposed to reflect the general will of the people, …
I suppose that many if not most will disagree with this conception of populism. They will then probably provide and defend an alternative conception. Is this a problem? Does it mean that the concept is useless? Of course not. The problem here is not to agree on the definition of a word, but to analyze a range of phenomena that many agree are relevant to understand the nature of current political life. The very concept is presumably useful in that it helps to organize the discussion, to conceive more detailed and systematic theories, and to design empirical studies. Sure, ultimately, we may conclude that the concept is not so relevant or useful. But I think that this is clearly premature and that it is worth exploring further the possibilities that it opens.
[1] Or think of the concepts of “capitalism”, “racism”, “political legitimacy”, “neoliberalism”, and many others.