The "Musk Problem of Liberalism"

On Accountability and Freedom

The other day on LinkedIn the following message (written by a political philosopher whose identity is irrelevant here) came into my feed:

It caught my attention because it indirectly relates to a key question that all societies, especially liberal societies, have to answer: up to which point are we not accountable to others for what we do? In which circumstances should one not be held responsible for one’s behavior? Or, to formulate things slightly differently, when are we spared from the requirement to justify our actions and attitudes to others?

The above message of course talks about Elon Musk. The assertion is twofold. First, it says that nobody is forced into buying a Tesla, being on X, voting for Musk’s ideas, and listening to Musk. To say that we’re not forced to do these things means that not only do we have the choice to avoid doing them in practice, but we also don’t have to justify this choice to anybody. In other words, we should not be held accountable by others for any choice related to these matters. Second, there is also presumably a corollary. Since nobody is forced to buy Musk’s cars or to vote for him, Musk is free to (try to) sell and to say what he wants. He’s no more accountable for what he says and sells than we are for not buying his products and words. Libertarians’ ideal society is in principle one where individuals are not accountable for anything, except for respecting commitments that they voluntarily form in their relations with others, most of the time through contracts.[1]

Now, most (other kinds of) liberals will agree with libertarians that the default assumption should probably be that we must not be held responsible for what we do, in the sense that except for specific reasons for the contrary, what I do is not your business and, whatever the effects for me or even for you, I don’t have to justify myself. This indeed corresponds to the presumption in favor of liberty that many liberals endorse. However, libertarians and other liberals come apart as the latter acknowledges that (i) there is a domain of actions and practices where individuals should be held accountable and (ii) the scope of this domain is not settled a priori but is itself open to disagreement.

Consider again the LinkedIn post above. The statement that “nobody has to buy a Tesla” expresses the classical and uncontroversial principle of what I shall call “market freedom.” In a market system, each of us is free to buy what they want in the sense that (except in special cases) nobody can rightfully interfere with their choices. Sellers too are free to sell what they want at the price they want. Generally, persons who choose in a market are “irresponsible” (or “unaccountable”) in the sense that whatever I choose to do and whatever the consequences, I don’t have to provide any justification. The choice of being or not on a particular social network is similar. It exemplifies the same kind of freedom that is recognized irrespective of the effects its exercise can have. The same largely applies to suppliers who create and maintain these networks, though we already see that things are not so straightforward – after all, some social networks have been banished in several liberal democracies over the last few years.

Things become even more intricate with the last two points, vote and speech. Sure, in liberal democracies, we are all free to vote as we see it fit without providing any justification. Hence, the practice of voting enjoys the same kind of “market freedom” than the practice of buying products. There is also few constraints on the supply side (in principle, almost anyone has the right to apply) but the kinds of ideas that are allowed to compete in the political market are nonetheless limited by the rules regulating (public) speech. While it’s true that nobody can force me to listen to someone’s speech, even less to “buy” it, there are in general limitations regarding what can be said. That means that speech is an activity where individuals are held accountable, at least when it is public. Speech does not fully belong to the domain of market freedom.

What determines when an individual is held accountable or not for what he does? It is tempting to say that there is accountability when one’s actions have effects on other individuals, especially when one is causing harm to someone else. This is of course the sense of the Millian harm principle. However, this is not plausible unless we qualify the kind of harm that is relevant. Suppose you have a restaurant in a tiny little street where no one else is selling food and that you enjoy relatively high profits. I decide to open my own restaurant just in front of yours and as a result your profits are cut in half. My decision has harmed you. Nonetheless, in market economies, I’ll not be held accountable. I don’t have to justify myself, neither to you nor to anyone else. More generally, so-called “pecuniary externalities” are generally not considered valid reasons for restraining an economic actor’s freedom to supply the kind of goods they wish at the price they wish. In the same way, the fact that you added an extension to your house that diminishes the “positional” value of my own house is not regarded as a valid reason for me to complain, even less to coerce you. Finally, in many cases, we do not view the fact that some persons are displeased or even psychologically hurt by someone’s speech or practices as enough to justify curbing this person’s (market) freedom. Hence, the existence of harm, even when widely acknowledged, is not enough for accountability.

Matters are different with respect to non-pecuniary externalities, i.e., effects (harmful or beneficial) not reflected in the price system. Here, economists tend to agree that the presence of such external effects make persons accountable. Interestingly, the difference of treatment between pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities comes less from the fact that the nature of harm differs than from the fact that the former but not the latter entails social inefficiency. Therefore, the main reason that grounds accountability (and therefore coercion) in this case is related to the collective consequences of the practices that are interfered with. It is not clear however that this reasoning applies to all kinds of externalities where accountability is nonetheless recognized. Hate speech is regulated and the primary reason is not (or may not be) that it could trigger systemic violence and lower everyone’s well-being. Rather, making people accountable for what they say in those cases is mainly motivated by considerations related to the respect of persons and communities. Also, many regulations on markets (e.g., labor market, markets for drugs or organs) are tied to fairness and paternalistic, rather than efficiency considerations.

The bottom line is that “market freedom” within and outside the context of market relationships is limited because societies tend to acknowledge a domain of practices where persons should be held accountable. While this is denied by libertarians, all other kinds of liberals recognize this. The great question is of course how and why a given society settles on a particular delimitation between the domains of accountability and non-accountability. Efficiency, fairness, paternalistic considerations, all are generic reasons that ground a particular delimitation but are not sufficient to fully determine it. In his stimulating book (that has partially inspired this discussion) Liberal Freedom, Eric MacGilvray claims that the partition between the two domains itself reflects a balance between market freedom on the one hand, and republican freedom on the other hand.[2] The latter is defined in terms of non-domination. To be free is to be in a situation one is not submitted to the arbitrary will of someone else. As argued by (neo-)republican authors such as Philip Pettit,[3] republican freedom must not be conflated with the liberal negative freedom defined in terms of noninterference. The fact of being interfered with doesn’t entail that one is being dominated because this interference may be based on impartial and impersonal rules that one has reason to accept. On the other hand, the slave who is not in practice interfered with is nonetheless submitted to the domination of their master. MacGilvray’s point is that republican freedom is a partial (because it’s not a substitute for market freedom) value of any liberal society that can justify, in some circumstances, curbing market freedom because it is recognized that not doing so would put persons under the domination of others. Republican freedom creates the conditions for persons to be held responsible for their choices by limiting domination, something that market freedom cannot guarantee.

I plan to return to MacGilvray’s book soon. The key point I want to emphasize here to finish is that while republican and market freedoms must be traded against each other, MacGilvray’s main claim is that the balance must itself be decided in the context of the relations of responsible persons enjoying republican freedom, i.e., through collective deliberation between political equals. In theory, that seems to imply that even though nobody is forced to buy Musk’s cars or ideas (the typical irresponsibility of market freedom), a liberal society may nonetheless consider that this is not enough and that the requirement of non-domination demands that de jure and de facto power of people like Musk be strictly restricted because it undermines our republican freedom.[4] The existence of powerful people like Musk, the argument would go, is incompatible with the conditions required to make free (in the republican sense) self-governance possible at all. Not all liberals will agree with that argument. Let’s call that the Musk Problem of Liberalism.

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[1] Libertarians who think that there are natural rights must logically also consider that there are natural duties, such as refraining from hurting or killing someone, except in very specific circumstances. In this sense, a modicum of accountability still prevails. It is reduced at its bare minimum, however.

[2] Eric MacGilvray, Liberal Freedom: Pluralism, Polarization, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

[3] Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[4] There are probably many ways to do so, for instance by limiting the amount of wealth than an individual can possess. See Ingrid Robeyns, Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth (New York: Astra House, 2024).