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It reminds me Alasdair MacIntyre asking why are literally all modern political ideologies versions of liberalism, even all versions of conservatism are actually versions of liberalism?

My defense of liberty would be this:

1) selfishness: people are more motivated to serve their own well-being, than other people are motivated to help them

2) self-knowledge: people know about their needs and how to meet them

This explains neatly some exceptions: children do not have much self-knowledge and their parents are highly motivated to serve the well-being of their children.

Okay, but then what about crazy ranting homeless people? Okay, they don't have much self-knowledge. But is the state highly motivated to serve their well-being, or just wants them to not be a nuisance?

And does the state really know their needs? What if they are extremely claustrophobic? Would make sense. I am extremely agoraphobic, if I would be homeless, I would find something like a cave, totally not sleep on the open street ever. Conversely there can be people who just cannot sleep in a room smaller than a basketball hall, right?

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This was an interesting line especially the surprising (to me) comment in parentheses:

“On even more moderate (and some would say not really liberal) views, liberty is one of the most important values and must be balanced with other very important considerations such as equality or welfare.”

I suppose this is where I distinctly depart with classical liberalism. It seems obvious to me that freedom from deprivation, isolation, inadequate resources and essential services, the stress of scarcity, significant shortfalls in status and respect, homelessness and a detrimental (chemical, biological, physical, auditory) environment is as important as any of the classical freedoms (just think of what matters day to day in people’s lives) and therefore has as much claim (if not more) to the label of liberalism as any other.

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I usually dislike thought experiments (trolleys, violinists, Jim and the Indians etc). Typically, they rely on intuition about far-fetched cases in which we are expected to act on counter-intuitive stipulations

In this case, my objection is simple. We all know that there are situations in which claims about rights clash, and that there is no simple formula that resolves these clashes. We can attempt coherence by requiring that similar cases be resolved similarly, and by trying to avoid irrelevance. For example, if you can stop me playing rock music late at night, I can stop you playing Beethoven. But how does the case of smashing pebbles on a beach tell us anything interesting about any other case.It's not of any interest in itself.

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The boring aspect is part of the point. There is no obvious norm the listener can point to that the pebble smasher is violating. He has no obligation to never smash pebbles. It doesn’t violate someone's rights, or make someone unequal, or create disorder and conflict. People smash pebbles all the time (e.g. to make concrete and other building materials). In this case, no building materials are being produced, but the activity is innocuous.

In Betty's case, there is a norm being violated: “mind your own business.” In the original version, Betty has no basis for objecting, or at least, none is mentioned. In Brennan and Freiman's alternative tellings, Betty is given some business to mind that involves either Alf or his smashed pebbles, something that at least motivates her interference, and perhaps justifies it.

From this perspective, liberty is the space within the constraints of our obligations. But that is a bit warped and Hobbesian. The ideal situation of liberty is not one where no one has obligations, or even the minimum number of obligations possible. It is closer to a situation where widely accepted norms and obligations create an environment conducive to getting important and worthwhile things done; which requires some degree of non-interference from one's neighbors.

Non-interference is the form of cooperation that we can provide to every other person, no matter how many there are.

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Still not seeing the value here. The rule that you can do what you want unless someone else has a good reason to stop you isn't controversial in our society. The problem is to determine which reasons are good,

Picking up pebbles from beaches is OK in lots of places, though not everywhere, and smashing pebbles you own has no obvious effects on Betty. How does that help society decide whether I can, for example, stop you playing music at 8pm?

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Perhaps there is no value. You may have missed the point of the post, but I am not sure I got it either. The original thought experiment illustrates a point you agree is trivial. Brennan and Freiman criticize it, and CH criticizes them in turn. The controversy seems to be about what thought experiments mean and how they work. I took the post as a defense, more or less, of Benn and Gaus. If you see nothing at stake there, I am not sure I can dissuade you.

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