Than you for this! A few impromptu remarks. (But will think about it.)
Yes, I assumed liberalism in the piece; but I was writing in Liberalcurrents.:)
1. We agree that the taboo on research/data and even discussion really makes it difficult to evaluate laïcité dispassionately. But notice that this actually is a further bit of evidence (already familiar to me, btw.) that laïcité. de facto involves a weird kind of self-censorship and public censorship. (It's especially weird that outspoken friends of free speech and laïcité fail to notice this fact--which is why I am grateful to you to make it explicit.)
2. In practice, French laïcité is much more relaxed about Christian symbols in public than others. In fact, there is considerable arbitrary enforcement. And this alone should a source of trouble (not just for the liberal, but also the republican).
3. I agree that my inclusion of Gauss/Vallier was a bit quick and dirty. (Kevin himself noted this.) And my own view is not far from Vallier's. But I don't think the view can be maintained in real political life, because it looks like it ends up drawing quite a few lines in fairly arbitrary ways and it relies on distinctions that are external to political practice. But I need to argue this more carefully. So for now I grant the point.
4. In fairness to french politicians, they are not alone in displaying minimal ethics of responsibility. It's a vice in many other European liberal democracies at the moment.
5. The fact that radical secularism cannot accommodate all religions, including ones that have thrived in France, suggests it is a bad model going forward. This is actually Manent's conclusion in a different more recent book. II disagree with Manen't proposed solution; but to echo Weber, we need a politics that can survive confrontation with reality. An unwillingness to acknowledge to acknowledge the facts (again see 1), is just a recipe for permanent bad strife.
6. On your first objection: the institutions of France qua France (with dirigisme, weak local politics, a strong President), are really vulnerable. Granted. I think the vulnerability is a bit reduced, on the margin, due to French participation in federal structure of the EU. But we know the EU is a weak bulwark. So, I think rather than a new social contract, French needs new institutional design. (This is not silly; France changes its political structures relatively frequently in all kinds of ways.)
7. Houellebecq's Soumission is written from the perspective of an academic who is rather lethargic. (I loved the book, by the way; it's a brilliant satire on academy, clearly inspired by Philip Roth and Coetzee.) It's true that I may be wrong about the long term effects of political contestation. And there are lines that (like Popper) I am willing to grant should be protected utmost. But I would also expect that different kind of coalition formations would also change some of these debates in ways that are hard to foresee.
Than you for this! A few impromptu remarks. (But will think about it.)
Yes, I assumed liberalism in the piece; but I was writing in Liberalcurrents.:)
1. We agree that the taboo on research/data and even discussion really makes it difficult to evaluate laïcité dispassionately. But notice that this actually is a further bit of evidence (already familiar to me, btw.) that laïcité. de facto involves a weird kind of self-censorship and public censorship. (It's especially weird that outspoken friends of free speech and laïcité fail to notice this fact--which is why I am grateful to you to make it explicit.)
2. In practice, French laïcité is much more relaxed about Christian symbols in public than others. In fact, there is considerable arbitrary enforcement. And this alone should a source of trouble (not just for the liberal, but also the republican).
3. I agree that my inclusion of Gauss/Vallier was a bit quick and dirty. (Kevin himself noted this.) And my own view is not far from Vallier's. But I don't think the view can be maintained in real political life, because it looks like it ends up drawing quite a few lines in fairly arbitrary ways and it relies on distinctions that are external to political practice. But I need to argue this more carefully. So for now I grant the point.
4. In fairness to french politicians, they are not alone in displaying minimal ethics of responsibility. It's a vice in many other European liberal democracies at the moment.
5. The fact that radical secularism cannot accommodate all religions, including ones that have thrived in France, suggests it is a bad model going forward. This is actually Manent's conclusion in a different more recent book. II disagree with Manen't proposed solution; but to echo Weber, we need a politics that can survive confrontation with reality. An unwillingness to acknowledge to acknowledge the facts (again see 1), is just a recipe for permanent bad strife.
6. On your first objection: the institutions of France qua France (with dirigisme, weak local politics, a strong President), are really vulnerable. Granted. I think the vulnerability is a bit reduced, on the margin, due to French participation in federal structure of the EU. But we know the EU is a weak bulwark. So, I think rather than a new social contract, French needs new institutional design. (This is not silly; France changes its political structures relatively frequently in all kinds of ways.)
7. Houellebecq's Soumission is written from the perspective of an academic who is rather lethargic. (I loved the book, by the way; it's a brilliant satire on academy, clearly inspired by Philip Roth and Coetzee.) It's true that I may be wrong about the long term effects of political contestation. And there are lines that (like Popper) I am willing to grant should be protected utmost. But I would also expect that different kind of coalition formations would also change some of these debates in ways that are hard to foresee.
Anyway thank you, again!