I like your use of Searle in order to make precise the claim how the state constitutes certain social facts. (I actually like Brian Epstein's account of social ontology better, but for our purposes that's not a big difference.) I am not sure, however, whether the legitimacy of the state really can do the work you want. For, 'legitimacy' is rather course-grained; and also I suspect that even deeply illigitimate states are capable of coercing authoritated views that are themselves not a matter of concern to friends of liberty.
PS Will think more on this
I like your use of Searle in order to make precise the claim how the state constitutes certain social facts. (I actually like Brian Epstein's account of social ontology better, but for our purposes that's not a big difference.) I am not sure, however, whether the legitimacy of the state really can do the work you want. For, 'legitimacy' is rather course-grained; and also I suspect that even deeply illigitimate states are capable of coercing authoritated views that are themselves not a matter of concern to friends of liberty.