I think the issue is precisely how you determine what it is to be a reasonable person. Rawls's definition of reasonableness is substantive and implies that reasonable persons have a sense of justice. The question is how shall we treat persons who don't have this sense of justice, who don't share the substantive commitments that are constitutive of Rawlsian reasonableness? Rawls's answer to the "paradox of toleration" is standard but I think it just shows that toleration and justification are not the same. The more diverse a society is, the less pluralism will be "reasonable". Is toleration enough in this kind of diverse society or should we aim for a more ambitious and wider justificatory endeavor? This is at least how I read the challenge sets up by the "new diversity theory" that I will discuss in the next post.
This reads to me as taking "reasonable persons" too literally. What matters are that the political principles meet the standards that reasonable persons would demand, rather than reasonableness setting community membership. I believe that Rawls's response to Popper's "paradox of toleration" is satisfactory, where illiberal speech is tolerated up until it threatens the stability of the liberal order. I'd say this principle meets the demands of public reason and there is no conundrum.
Although I'm looking for your next piece on the matter and what shortcomings you find with Rawls's response.
I think the issue is precisely how you determine what it is to be a reasonable person. Rawls's definition of reasonableness is substantive and implies that reasonable persons have a sense of justice. The question is how shall we treat persons who don't have this sense of justice, who don't share the substantive commitments that are constitutive of Rawlsian reasonableness? Rawls's answer to the "paradox of toleration" is standard but I think it just shows that toleration and justification are not the same. The more diverse a society is, the less pluralism will be "reasonable". Is toleration enough in this kind of diverse society or should we aim for a more ambitious and wider justificatory endeavor? This is at least how I read the challenge sets up by the "new diversity theory" that I will discuss in the next post.
This reads to me as taking "reasonable persons" too literally. What matters are that the political principles meet the standards that reasonable persons would demand, rather than reasonableness setting community membership. I believe that Rawls's response to Popper's "paradox of toleration" is satisfactory, where illiberal speech is tolerated up until it threatens the stability of the liberal order. I'd say this principle meets the demands of public reason and there is no conundrum.
Although I'm looking for your next piece on the matter and what shortcomings you find with Rawls's response.